BOOK REVIEW

A NEW PARADIGM FOR FREE SPEECH SCHOLARSHIP
DAVID AJ. RicHARDst
What is the proper scope of protection of the American
constitutional doctrine of free speech? Both C. Edwin Baker's
Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech1 and Kent Greenawalt's Speech,
Crime, and the Uses of Language2 make major methodological and
substantive contributions to our understanding of how this question
should be understood and answered.
For Baker and Greenawalt, both the interpretation and critical
evaluation of the American doctrine of free speech must methodologically bring into play deeper premises of democratic political
and social theory, in which free speech plays a pivotal role. Baker
deploys a critical social democratic theory prominently associated
withJurgen Habermas3 in his analysis, and Greenawalt, building on
his own previous major contributions to both the theory of law and
morality and the theory of religious liberty, 4 embeds his discussion
of free speech in a larger political theory of constitutional government. Both books are thus ambitiously and successfully interdisciplinary, making crucial appeals to philosophical and social theories
not only of just government but (in Greenawalt's case) to philosophical theories of language. Each book brilliantly demonstrates
the interpretive and critical fertility of this kind of approach, and
their publication in the same year marks a new era of free speech
scholarship in which the best work-pitched at the level of ambition
and rigor of Baker and Greenawalt-powerfully integrates legal
analysis with critical and philosophical theory. 5 This essay attempts
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to characterize both the distinctive methodology and substance of
this new approach to the theory of free speech.
The major contribution of this new paradigm of free speech
scholarship is twofold: first, it clarifies larger patterns of interpretive principle implicit in the current law of free speech in the
United States; and second, it affords better critical thinking about
whether the current state of law is correct. Both issues are central
to the agenda of free speech scholarship in the United States, and
we want an understanding of both issues from a theory of free
speech. The American law of free speech is notoriously controversial within the Supreme Court itself, the legal profession, and the
larger political community of the United States. Responsible free
speech scholarship accordingly must assist us not only in understanding the law that is uncontroversially clear and settled but also
the law that is interpretively controversial.
The familiar positivist understanding of this project sharply
demarcates the task of describing the clear and settled law-the easy
cases governed by rule or clear convention-from that of discussing
the more controversial interpretive questions-the hard cases
governed by normative goals, including, conspicuously, those of
utilitarian policy. 6 The signal importance of the new paradigm of
free speech scholarship practiced by Baker and Greenawalt is that
it abandons this positivist understanding in favor of the alternative
idea that both tasks make crucial reference to deeper issues of
critical and philosophicaL theory, including, prominently, the
explication of anti-utilitarian claims of human rights. One is not, as
it were, only free to play political philosophy in the lacunae of openended policy-making not already filled by settled law and precedent;
rather, the task of political. philosophy in law under a rights-based
constitution is pervasive throughout the interpretive enterprise of
law.

(1982). Schauer's work is notable mainly for identifying some
of the main philosophical issues in the theory of free speech and focusing on difficulties
in current philosophical approaches to these issues. The book does not, however, itself
advance a coherent philosophical approach to these matters of the sort that Baker and
Greenawalt respectively propose; indeed, Schauer's constructive argument-one of
toleration-is ill-defined and problematic. For an approach similar to Schauer's, see L.
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY:

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN

AMERICA (1986). For criticism of both Schauer and Bollinger, see Richards, Toleration
and Free Speech, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323 (1988).
6 The classic contemporary statement of this position is H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 121-32 (1961).

1990]

NEW PARADIGM FOR FREE SPEECHSCHOLARSHIP

273

Greenawalt's book-a major contribution to the theory of free
speech-rather brilliantly demonstrates the nature and fertility of
this new approach to legal theory. The book's theoretical focus is
the interpretive explanation of an uncontroversial commonplace of
free speech doctrine in the United States: criminal law doctrines
criminalizing forms of speech-for example, the speech acts involved
in criminal solicitation, conspiracy, accessorial liability-typically do
not raise free speech issues, a point that Oliver Wendell Holmes
made in its classic form in the quartet of early free speech cases
with which the study of the contemporary American doctrine usually
begins. 7 Greenawalt takes as a central issue of free speech scholarship the general acceptance of Holmes's exclusions from free speech
protection, and constructs a general theory of the protection of free
speech to explain why these uncontroversial interpretive banalities
reflect defensible principles of free speech protection. Those
principles are, in turn, critically used in the evaluation of more
controversial cases of free speech interpretation, in which Greenawalt offers plausible, if not always convincing, arguments for why
the issue is not properly in the core of free speech protection.
Baker's book comparably starts from a general theory of what he
considers the core value of free speech protection implicit in much
current free speech doctrine: his liberty theory of free speech. He
then uses the theory to evaluate other views-in particular, what he
calls "the classic marketplace of ideas theory"-that betray that
value, and offers a critical indictment of bodies of current law that,
in Baker's view, also betray that value, including not only the rather
controversial recent expansion of free speech protection to
advertising, 9 but the rather uncontroversial general doctrines of
neutral time, place, and manner regulations1 ° and their specific
11
application to mandatory parade permits.
The common methodology of both books enables them to make
searching criticisms of orthodox views of free speech. For example,
an important contribution of both books to substantive issues of
free speech protection is their quite convincing challenge to the
7

See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting); Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
8 This is the title of chapter one of Baker's book. See G.E. BAKER, supra note 1, at
6.
9 See id. at 194-224.
10See id. at 125-37.
" See i& at 138-60.
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dominant political process model of free speech protection
associated classically with Alexander Meiklejohn 12 and, more
recently, with John Hart Ely' 3 and (in a particularly cramped and
14
narrow form) with Robert Bork.
This theory of free speech conceives the core function of such
speech to be the protection of the democratic political process from
abusive censorship of political debate by the transient, elected
majority in political power. The appeal of Ely's form of the theory
is its forthright response to the democratic objection to judicial
review. With this model of free speech protection, judicial review
on free speech grounds does not run afoul of the democratic
objection to judicial review, for judicial review here protects the
integrity of democracy itself from the illegitimate attempt of a
transient majority to entrench its own power by manipulating the
agenda of political debate in its own favor.15 The judiciary does
not, in Ely's view, illegitimately impose its substantive values on
democratic majorities, but legitimately insists upon and monitors a
6
view of democratic procedural fairness.'
The very coherence of this approach to free speech protection
requires a background conception of democratic legitimacy, that is,
forms of political power that democratic majorities may and may
not legitimately exercise. Such a background conception must itself
be a substantive view of the values of democratic constitutionalism.
Both Baker and Greenawalt cogently question whether these values
can be understood in terms of perfecting the majoritarian political
process. Baker puts the point in terms of a substantive value of
equal respect for the moral self-determination of all persons, and
assesses the legitimacy of democracy, to the extent it is legitimate,
as a political process that realizes that independent value:
Liberty presumably must include the opportunity for involvement
in the choice of, or responsible acceptance and affirmation of,
those elements of our world that are matters of human creation
and that are important for a person's self-definition and selfrealization. This notion of liberty, combined with the obvious fact
12See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLiTCAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTTUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 26-27 (1960).
13 SeeJ.H. ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 105-16
(1980).
14 See Bork, Neutral PrinciplesandSome FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35
(1971).
15 SeeJ.H. ELY, supra note 13, at 102-03, 106-07.
16 See id.
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that many of these elements are necessarily a matter of collective
practice, choice, or consensus, means that liberty must permit
involvement in this collective process, presumably in a manner that
permits a like involvement by others-in other words, respect for
17
liberty implies some type of democracy.
Greenawalt advances a similar argument in terms of the
remarkable American constitutional commitment to principles of
religious liberty and the important place of free speech in giving
proper expression to these principles. 18 To the extent free speech
must give expression to the communicative interests of liberty of
conscience, the limitation of protection of free speech to politics is
clearly inadequate: "Once freedom of religious ideas is acknowledged, distinguishing protected speech from unprotected speech,
say about science or personal morality, becomes almost absurd." 19
From the perspective of Baker and Greenawalt, constitutionally
legitimate political power must respect substantive spheres of moral
independence-like liberty of conscience, including all matters of
fact and value fundamental to the exercise of conscience-and the
right of free speech, through which persons exercise their constructive powers of moral independence, must correlatively extend to all
such matters. The limitation of free speech protection to politics is,
on this view, illegitimate because it allows forms of censorship that
deprive persons of the liberties essential to the moral self-government of a free people.
Baker and Greenawalt suggest (in my view quite rightly") a
larger research project about the principles of democratic constitutionalism. Those principles cannot, as a matter either of sound
interpretation of our tradition or of defensible democratic political
theory, be understood on the political'process model of perfecting
the majoritarian political process.
As an interpretive matter, the constitutional tradition regards all
forms of political power-including the power of democratic majorities-as corruptible, and subjects such power to a system of
institutional constraints-including judicial review-designed to
harness that power to the legitimate ends of government, namely,
respect for human rights and the use of power to advance the public
17 C.E. BAKER, supra note 1, at 31.

18 Se K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 177-79.
'9 Id. at 178.
20 1 develop this argument at greater length in D. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS

AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONALsM 189-201 (1989).
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good. A perfected political majoritarianism cannot be and is not
the measure of constitutional legitimacy because, by virtue of its
majoritarian character, it remains hostile to the rights and interests
of minorities.
For example, a majority's views of dangerously subversive speech
are constitutionally unacceptable grounds for the repression of
speech: 21 dissident minority challenges to majoritarian views are
precisely those that most require protection, and majoritarian views
cannot justly be the measure of such protection.2 2 Further, as
Greenawalt makes clear, the very focus of political process models
of free speech on politics as such fails to do interpretive justice to
the important strand of free speech protection rooted in the right
to conscience. If a free speech theory must satisfy some minimal
threshold of accommodating the main interpretive strands of our
free speech tradition over time, the political process model clearly
fails to do so. Its descriptive value is inadequate, indeed distorting.
Is its normative value as political theory any better?
As a matter of democratic political theory, political process
models familiarly rest on a form of preference utilitarianism. For
23
example, Ely understands democracy as "the pluralist's bazaar"
that, properly functioning, aggregates human interests by means of
shifting coalitions that achieve their ends through majoritarian
interest group politics. Democratic majority rule is the political
decision procedure that best achieves the ends of utilitarian
aggregation.
Utilitarianism has, however, been subjected to
profound contemporary criticism as an inadequate normative theory
of equality, in part because its theory of equality gives no adequate
expression to the place of respect for human rights in the normative
24
idea of treating persons as equals.
The utilitarian theory of free speech clearly exemplifies this
inadequacy; the net aggregate of pleasure over pain is often
advanced, not frustrated, by the restriction of speech. Large
populist majorities often relish (hedonically speaking) the repression
of outcast dissenters, the numbers and pains of dissenters are by
21 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
22 For fuller elaboration of this view, see D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 178-87 (1986).
23 SeeJ.H. ELY,

supra note

13, at 152.

24 See generally J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (proposing as the most
appropriate moral basis for a democratic society a theory of justice having its
foundations in the traditional theory of the social contract, as espoused by Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant).
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comparison small, and often no offsetting future net aggregate of
pleasure over pain exists to make up the difference. 25 We need a
political theory of free speech that correctly interprets free speech
as a human right that, as a matter of basic constitutional principle,
outweighs such utilitarian calculations.
American doctrines of religious liberty and free speech are
natural starting points for this alternative research project, as they
are pivotal constructive components of the kind of reasonable
public argument in terms of which exercises of political power must
be justified if they are to be constitutionally legitimate. Constitutional argument in the United States has a dignity and weight
distinctive from ordinary political argument because it addresses the
fundamental question of what lends legitimacy to any exercise of
political power. It is fundamental to the constitutional project not
only that all forms of political power are corruptible, but that they
are corruptible in a distinctive way: they deprive persons of the
capacity to know, understand, and make effective claim to their
basic human rights. Correlatively, corrupted political power is
distorted from its proper role of advancing the interests of all alike
in pursuit of justice and the public good. The argument for
religious toleration was, for leading American constitutionalists like
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, a model for both the
corruptibility of political power-subverting the right to conscience-and its constitutional remedy-namely, depriving the state
26
of any power to enforce or endorse sectarian religious belief.
In effect, the exercise of political power for religious ends had
entrenched a sectarian conception of religious truth as the measure
of all reasonable inquiry about religious matters, and thus had
deprived persons of their inalienable human rights reasonably to
exercise their own moral powers about such matters. Such exercises
of political power solidified a kind of self-perpetuating political
irrationalism that deprived people of reasonable government. In
effect, government exercised its political power in ways that neither
respected people's right to reasonable self-government in their own
moral and religious life, nor subjected its own power to reasonable
justification in terms of the pursuit of equal justice and the public
good. Arguments of constitutional principle have the weight that
they do precisely because they subject such corruptions of political

2 See D. RICHARDS, supra note 20, at 191-92.
26 See D. RICHARDS, supra note 22, at 111-16.
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power to appropriate constraints that require reasonable justification of political power in terms of respect for rights and the use of
political power to advance justice and the public good.
The principle of free speech plays the central role it does among
constitutional principles and structures because it deprives the state
of power over speech based on self-entrenching judgments of the
worth or value of speech that expresses sincere convictions about
matters of fact and value in which a free people reasonably take
interest. 27 Speech in the relevant sense must be free from certain
forms of state control both to insure that censorious state judgments are not the measure of reasonable discussion in society at
large, and to allow the broadest possible exercise of a free people's
reasonable powers consistent with respect for their human rights
and their rights as citizens to hold exercises of political power
accountable both in terms of respect for rights and of the use of
power to advance equal justice and the public good.
If constitutional argument depends for its dignity and weight on
subjecting political power to such independent tests of reasonable
justification, free speech is the foundation for the practicability of
suchjustification. Free speech insures a constitutional space for the
kind of reasonable public argument, open debate, and criticism to
which, on grounds of constitutional legitimacy, all forms of political
power must be subject. It would, of course, doom the entire project
to emptiness and triviality if the state's judgments were the
procrustean measure to Which all such discourse must be fitted.
Both Baker and Greenawalt endorse and develop a view of the
basis for free speech along these general lines. What attracts Baker
to Habermas's dialogical ethical and political theory is precisely the
central role that theory accords communicative independence and
the implicit normative requirement of reasonable justification in the
communicative situation; 21 3 Greenawalt's pluralistic account of the
foundations of free speech gives prominent weight to autonomy and
29
reasonable justification.
27

For a more developed discussion of this perspective, see D. RICHARDS, supra note

20, at 172-201; D. RICHARDS, supnz note 22, at 165-227.

28 See, e.g., C.E. BAKER, supra note 1, at 107, 110 (concurringin Habermas's view that

progressive social change can -only fully be achieved through employment of
communicative action rather than reliance on mere instrumental action).
29 See, e.g., K. GREENAWALT, supranote 2, at 26-27 (stating that the free exchange of
ideas encourages people to decide for themselves, a process, which, when pursued in
a rational manner, leads to self-fulfillment).
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Neither theorist gives extended treatment to the nature and
basis of the conception he proposes and assumes. Indeed, Greenawalt criticizes Thomas Scanlon's early, and later abandoned,
formulation of the conception as too strong.30
The idea, in
Greenawalt's formulation, is that government should treat people
as rationally autonomous by allowing them to have all the information that might be helpful to the choices of rationally autonomous
persons. But the state, Greenawalt argues, has a legitimate interest
in protecting people from social harms when they do not act in a
rationally autonomous way, and this interest may require that the
state not always allow every person to have all the information that
a rationally autonomous person might want. Greenawalt critiques
not, of course, the idea of reasonable justification as the test for
free speech, but rather a certain (in his view) implausible application
of the test. In effect, his argument is that the simple principle of
information for rationally autonomous people is not reasonable
because it fails to give weight to considerations relevant to a
reasonably justifiable principle of free speech. But Greenawalt
offers us no general constructive account of the approach he
assumes, an account that would presumably explain the weight that
should properly be accorded autonomy and the nature and the
weight of the harms that may be traded off against autonomy.31
It is much more clear that Greenawalt, like Baker, regards the
political process models and the utilitarianism such models usually
assume as a wholly unacceptable approach to the theory of free
speech.
Within this general conception of the role of free speech in
American constitutionalism-one shared by both Baker and
Greenawalt-there is, of course, much room for continuing debate
and disagreement about the proper scope of the protection of free
speech. Baker, for example, offers two quite radical criticisms of
the current state of American constitutional law: first, he questions
the accepted wisdom of the constitutional acceptability in general
of time, place, and manner regulations3 2 and the particular
acceptability of mandatory parade permits;3 3 second, he funda0 See id at 31-33.
31 Greenawalt more elaborately explored this issue in an earlier work. See K.

GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supranote 2, at 87-211. For my critique of that
book, see Richards, Book Review, 23 GA. L. REV. 1189 (1989).
32 See G.E. BAKER, supra note 1, at 125-37.

33 See id. at 138-60.
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mentally criticizes the recent expansion of free speech protection to
commercial speech. 4 Greenawalt also raises some questions about
the latter expansion,35 though not the former.
Baker's worries about the alleged constitutional reasonableness
of time, place, and manner regulations, and in particular, mandatory parade permits, derive from the priority he accords free speech
among constitutional and political values. Time, place, and manner
regulations are conventionally constitutional because the state
regulatory judgments do not advert to the value of the speech in
question, but, rather, reasonably accommodate the interests of all
speakers equally to legitimate state interests such as traffic control.36 Baker's point is that the relatively weak reasonableness test
to which the judiciary subjects such regulations unfairly tilts the
constitutional balance against the most controversial forms of
dissident speech; in effect, the state protects the status quo under
cover of appeal to the reasonableness of the regulation in question.
His analysis is particularly critical of mandatory parade permits
because a voluntary system would better accommodate legitimate
state interests without the untoward prejudice to "value-based
dissent and self-expressive peaceful deviance."3 7 If free speech
does enjoy the priority among political values that Baker rightly
accords it, his critical arguments here have, in my judgment, great
force.
The critical force of his argument against the free speech protection of advertisements is much more questionable. The nerve of
Baker's objection is that the core of free speech protection is the
spontaneous and authentic expression of sincere moral, social, or
political conviction, and that commercial speech does not express
such conviction, but is rather controlled and manipulated by
economic interests and structures. 38 The problem with Baker's

3 See id. at 194-224.
35 See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 22, 117, 133-34, 271, 276, 321-22.

36 See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941) (upholding a state
statute requiring that a special license first be obtained before commencement of a
'parade or procession" upon a public street); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-52
(1938) (declaring facially invalid a city ordinance that "probibit[ed] the distribution of
literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner without a permit
from the City Manager").
37 C.E. BAKER, supra note 1, at 159.
"8 Greenawalt makes a similar point, but to more modest critical effect: he
emphasizes that the regulatory power of the state in areas such as deceptive and false
advertisingis greater than would be appropriate in other areas of free speech protection
such as political and religious speech. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 321-22.
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form of criticism is both its questionable denigration on alleged free
speech grounds of speech motivated by economic interests, and its
problematic theory of manipulative causation by economic forces.
Much clearly protected speech is economically motivated, including,
of course, much of the print media. It would be unacceptable to
give less protection to such free speech interests because of
background economic motivation when the same worries about state
censorship apply here as elsewhere. The economic motivation of
advertisements does not as such disqualify them from free speech
protection to the extent such protections are otherwise in order.
Baker's structural theory of manipulation equally proves too
much: much clearly protected speech-including religious speech
embedded in a church hierarchy--would be unacceptably disqualified on similar such grounds. We need a theory for determining
when background institutions, which the speaker assumes, do and
do not disqualify her speech from free speech protection, and it is
difficult to square any such theory with the neutrality called for by
the First Amendment. It would appear particularly difficult for
Baker to offer such an account when his general views are so
sensitive to the role of background social institutions, including
language, in the formation of moral identity and the need for
sufficient state neutrality among such institutions to allow a
constitutional space for personal liberty that fosters sufficient moral
autonomy for the person to make reasonable choices among these
background institutions. But these arguments against Baker's view
assume that at least some regulations of commercial speech might
plausibly raise valid free speech concerns. Do they?
The principle of free speech, as we have seen, deprives the state
of power over speech based on self-entrenching judgments of the
worth or value of speech that expresses sincere convictions about
matters of fact and value in which a free people reasonably takes
interest. At least some state prohibitions of true advertisements
reflect constitutionally suspicious judgments by professional groups
that self-entrench power and privilege at the expense of persons'
wholly reasonable interests in knowing facts relevant to securing
services and products that other persons sincerely want to make
known to them. Undoubtedly, there are constitutionally significant
differences between the level of protection to be accorded advertisements in general and forms of speech about critical value in
living or political matters; but the principle of free speech validly
applies at least to some true advertisements, and the judicial
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scrutiny of such advertisements on free speech grounds is, pace
Baker, a reasonable elaboration of the principle of free speech.3 9
Baker is understandably concerned with integrating the principle
of free speech into the larger framework of a theory of economic
and social redistributive justice, and his analysis of commercial
speech may reflect this concern. One may agree, as I do, that the
principle of free speech should be sensitive to these concerns, but
disagree with the way in which Baker gives expression to this
concern. The extension of free speech analysis to commercial
speech in the way defended above may have, if anything, undercut
the power of privileged professional groups and empowered the
capacity of ordinary people to secure goods and services at lower
prices; 40 the redistributive effects of such free speech scrutiny thus
work in the direction that Baker should endorse. Paradoxically,
Baker questions these decisions, and does not question othersnotoriously, Buckley v. Valeo41-that, on specious free speech
grounds, disabled the state from attempting to equalize the degree
42
to which economic power is transformed into political power.
Greenawalt's theory is, in contrast to Baker's, less starkly critical
of the current state of free speech law in the United States. Indeed,
it may not be critical enough. Greenawalt defends, for example, the
currentjudicial understanding of the exclusion of allegedly obscene
materials from free speech on the ground that hard-core pornography has "little enough expressive value" in contrast to "ordinary
43
claims of fact and value."
Greenawalt's treatment of this issue is rather strained and
ultimately unconvincing since he does not adopt the dominant view
of those who take this position-namely, that hard-core pornography, appealing to prurient interests, is not intellectually communicative in the way that free speech protection requires. As Barendt

s9 For further development of this argument, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 22, at
209-15.
40 This argument was prominent in Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 'Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (noting that
advertising might reduce cost of legal services).
41 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
42 For fuller discussion, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 22, at 215-19. For Baker's
objections to the equalization of free speech power, see C.E. BAER supra note 1, at 41,
45, 297 n.50.
43 See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 308. Baker, consistent with his generally
more critical posture to conventional judicial wisdom, attacks the exclusion. See C.E.
BAKER, supra note 1, at 68-69.
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recently put this point, hard-core pornography is no more speech
"44 Of
than "the supply of sex aids, or the provision of prostitutes.
course, a hard-core pornographic depiction is a communicative
symbol; it is neither a dildo, nor a prostitute. It is surely confused
to equate the stimulation of erotic and sensual imagination by use

of pornography with sexual devices or partners; that is the same
kind of confusion, so transparently inimical to legitimate free
speech interests, that led the Puritans to equate the imaginative
pleasures of an evening at the theatre of Hamlet with actual
fratricide, incest, and revengeful murder. Greenawalt is not
confused in this way, and clearly recognizes that free speech
protection now may extend to many forms of art that "create
45
intense emotional experience that does not involve detachment."
In view of his appreciation of these issues, Greenawalt's appeal to
"little enough expressive value" hardly meets the free speech
objection to censorious state judgments aimed at speech; rather, his
appeal-to a kind of unexamined conclusory judgment of conventional and often today quite hypocritical Puritanical sexual moralism-instantiates the objection.
Greenawalt fails to take sufficiently seriously what should be at
the heart of a principled free speech analysis of this matter: that
obscenity laws are directed at the kind of erotic imaginative life of
which hard-core pornographic material is the natural communicative
vehicle, on grounds of a self-entrenching political objection to the
humane values of imaginative erotic sensuality and sensibility.
Historically, obscenity laws have been used to object to the erotic
imagination as such as a human good independent of procreation.
There are compelling free speech principles that extend protection
against continuing attempts to prohibit material on such grounds,
prohibitions that would deprive free persons of the reasonable
exercise of their imaginative powers over issues central to finding
value in life. The argument that such material has "little enough
expressive value" embodies precisely the kind ofjudgment of which
we have good reason, on grounds of free speech, to be constitutionally suspicious: the objection of conventional majoritarian taste to
the independent exercise of the conscientious moral powers of free
people.
44 E. BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 272 (1985).
45
K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 305.
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The tendency of politically repressive majoritarian tastes to
hystericalize harms and denigrate value in the communicative
expression of dissenting convictions is at the very heart of the
constitutional principle of free speech that forbids such majoritarian
taste to be the measure of legitimate public discussion and expression. It subverts the critical purpose of such a constitutional
principle to truncate its demands on the basis of precisely the
conventional denial of expressive value in a communicative medium
that has been the traditional argument for the repression of
46
freedom of thought, inquiry, and expression.
Even when Baker and Greenawalt agree about an issue of the
scope of free speech protection-that coercive speech is and should
be unprotected speech-they offer provocatively different reasons
for their common conclusion.4 7 Baker would exclude such speech
because of its coercive character. Such speech, by virtue of its
coerciveness, does not enjoy protection on the kind of liberty theory
that Baker proposes. For Greenawalt, on the other hand, the crucial
issue is that coercive speech is not an expression of claims of
existing facts and value at :he core of free speech protection but a
species of speech act that does not enjoy such protection because it
alters the situation from what it was previously.
Baker and Greenawalt discuss each other's views at some length,
and their disagreement bears close study. Baker makes the cogent
point that Greenawalt's grounds for exclusion do not precisely
correspond with what he wants to include in and exclude from free
speech protection. The core of free speech protection may be the
conscientious expression of facts and values on issues in which a
free people takes a reasonable interest, but such fully protected
expressions sometimes achieve their point in situation-altering
speech acts of public civil disobedience and refusal to
obey-including challenges, orders, demands, and pleas. These
speech acts are, of course, still fully protected and thus subject to
4 8
the usual heavy burden on the state to justify abridgement.
46 For further elaboration of this view, see D. RIcHARDs, supra note 22, at 203-09.
47 See C.E. BAKER, supra note 1, at 62-65; K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 96-99.
48 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (finding freedom of
speech rights violated by allowing officials unfettered discretion in regulating use of
streets for peaceful parades and meetings); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(holding that police officials ordering the dispersement of African-American college
students peacefully expressing their grievances to citizens of South Carolina violated
freedom of speech); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (ruling that the use
of streets for picketing and parading is subject to regulation, but may not be completely
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Greenawalt resorts to an artificial semantic category that does not
really work because he wants to resist excessive theoretical dependence on a moral concept of autonomy, like Baker's, that may be
too controversial. 4 9 Greenawalt's argument might have more
weight if his own view plausibly fit the case law he, like Baker,
endorses, but it does not. Baker's theory has at this point-in
contrast to many other cases-the competitive edge over Greenawalt's in explaining and justifying conventional judicial wisdom.
Neither theorist would regard mere fit with existing case law as
sufficient to justify his view; each would place independent weight
on the critical power of his views as democratic political theory. But
at this point, again, Baker's views more plausibly explain the unprotected character of coercive speech as a consequence of the basic
way in which constitutional democracy regards citizens, namely, as
free and rational persons whose free exercise of their deliberative
powers is the test for the legitimacy of government. For this
fundamental reason of democratic political theory, coercive speech
does not and should not enjoy the protection of the principles of
free speech that preserve-immune from political bargaining-the
status of citizens as free and equal.
The new paradigm of free speech scholarship implicit in these
two important books leaves open many important questions for
future debate, and neither book will be the last word on the
controversial questions they examine. The very range of their
differences in style and in substance bespeaks the extraordinary
diversity of thought and feeling that their common paradigm makes
available to free speech scholarship. Their paradigm thus promises
to liberate both the depth and range of our interpretive powers.
We are only at the beginning of the most rudimentary understanding of how misconceived much traditional legal scholarship about
free speech has been, and how much remains to be done if we can
bring to the task the integrity and vision that Baker and Greenawalt
show us now to be within our grasp.
These books raise the constitutional theory of free speech to a
new level of interdisciplinary sophistication and depth. They are
pathbreaking achievements of constitutional scholarship in particular and legal scholarship more generally. We will be worthy of their
achievement when we understand, as they do, that the life of the
denied).
49 See K.

GREENAWALT,

supra note 2, at 97.
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mind in law cannot be isolated from the life of the mind in the
universities from which American law schools remain unfortunately
and stupidly alienated. Baker and Greenawalt show us by their
practice that the life of the mind in law is one with the life of the
mind in social and political philosophy, that we cannot be adequate
to the interpretation of law until we bring to the interpretive
enterprise the better tools of political philosophy that are now
available. In short, a better interpretive practice requires better and
more responsible use of theory, and conversely. It is educationally
bankrupt hermetically to isolate the study of these subjects in
different schools of the university; the study of law should be, in
universities, what it is in fact, the central subject of the humane
education of a free and civilized people.
Could it be that our generation might make more of the
position of the law school i:n the university than the misleading and
often cruel mockery it has been for our students? If we could or
would, the American law school might yet show us that American
democratic anti-intellectualism-with its sharp division between
theory and practice-is worse than stupid and vapid. It is tragically
irresponsible. It fails to grasp what democratic education should
have imparted to our public culture: the unity of theory and
practice is at the very heart. of the interpretive responsibilities of a
50
free people worthy of their constitutional freedoms.

50 For a fuller statement of this view, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 20, at 294-99.

